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COMPELLED ASSOCIATION, MORALITY,
AND MARKET DYNAMICS
Seana Shiffrin*
Given the occasion, it seems appropriate to begin on a personal
note. It should come as no surprise that my father has influenced me
enormously. It may seem a little more unusual that his work on
commercial speech had a formative effect on me as a teenager.
My father, Steve, as I will call him so as not to get overly
familial, was working on his Northwestern article on commercial
speech' when I began looking at colleges. We took a driving trip to
look at some East Coast campuses. Every day in the car, he mooted
the article to me, seemingly seeking my views and testing my
intuitions. Of course, he was really working out the ideas by
speaking them aloud to himself and teaching them to the most
inexperienced of audiences. That trip and that article had a strong
intellectual and personal impact. Intellectually, I can trace the
origins of my interest in the trifecta of intellectual property, privacy,
and freedom of speech to hours of conversation about one particular
example: whether Frank Sinatra should be able to prevent Mercedes
or even Time magazine from reporting what car he drives.' The
personal part: on the trip, a male Dartmouth tour guide casually
mentioned to Steve, in front of me, the great losses to the school
occasioned by gender integration. The fireworks of Steve's outrage
coupled with his genuine interest in my reactions to his ideas,
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1. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983).
2. See id. at 1257 n.275.
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especially when they dissented from his own, conveyed how deeply
and sincerely his feminism ran and that he could be counted on to be
a solid ally in the feminist cause. If only through the propinquity of
attention, the episode together with our talks oriented me toward
another lifelong interest: the interactions between commitments to
equality-social and economic-and freedom of speech. Finally, the
actual article delivered some lessons in humility. When the article
came out, I sat down to read it, expecting to reminisce with a familiar
friend. Not only did I emerge thinking commercial speech was a
thicket (one of its intended lessons), but even the vocabulary eluded
me. I still remember learning the terms "insouciant"3 and "ipse
dixit"' that day.
That article still has the ability to pull me up short, but in a good
way. To Steve's mild chagrin, my attraction to philosophical
thinking comes hand-in-hand with an instinct toward trying to locate
general, unifying principles.' Among the virtues of the Northwestern
article: it lays bare how the many complexities of commercial speech
pose substantial obstacles to discovering useful and true
comprehensive principles in this area.
So, in the spirit of Steve's message of necessary eclecticism,6 I
want to voice some musings and worries about the broader
applicability of an approach to commercial speech for which I have
sympathy, but which might profit from the sort of disruption
delivered by Steve's attention to context and his openness to non-
architectonic design. Specifically, I want to address some neglected
complications raised by the compelled commercial speech and
association cases for those interested in integrating ethical behavior
and motivations into market activities.
As Kathleen Sullivan has noted, we are justifiably wary of
trusting the government on speech and more comfortable trusting the
government on market regulation.7 The question of compelled
3. Id. at 1217.
4. Id. at 1221.
5. See STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 125
(1990) ("[T]o have a system is to lack integrity." (citing FRIEDRICH W. NIETZSCHE, Twilight of
the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 463, 470 (W. Kaufmann trans., 1968))).
6. See Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV.
1103, 1192-1216 (1983).
7. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 23-24, 2007), in Thoughts on
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commercial associations that produce compelled speech is possibly
so hard because it hits both bases: it involves straightforward forms
of market regulation and social engineering, as well as compelled
speech. Through what lens should we view it?
In a prior defense of freedom of voluntary association as a direct
form of freedom of speech, I used considerations about freedom of
thought as a touchstone to argue that voluntary associations should
be able to exclude potential or actual members for any reason
whatsoever, including discriminatory reasons, or for no reason.8
Individuals, I contended, should have access to some social, extra-
familial space in which they feel they may let down their guard and
be influenced by others;9 this in turn may require complete
discretionary powers to exclude unwanted members." I claimed that
the free speech protection to exercise these powers should not
depend on the powers being wielded in an articulate way or to
protect an already formulated message."
I argued, however, that at least some commercial entities and
other institutional associations operating in the market were
different. 2 Given the structure of competitive economic markets and
commercial agents' typically narrow aims, the market forum is
typically not a propitious space for individuals' exercise of freedom
of thought irrespective of governmental regulation. 3  Further,
employment markets represent an especially important site for the
distribution of basic social resources. 4 Since the freedom of thought
and other associational values I championed could be satisfied in the
space of voluntary associations, strict inclusive regulations on access
to employment seemed for these reasons insulated from the First
Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 333, 338 (2007); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 950-51 (1995); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 214 (1994).
8. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 Nw.
U. L. REV. 839, 851-73 (2005).
9. Id. at 873-74.
10. Id. at 874.
11. Id. at 875-76.
12. Id. at 877.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Amendment concerns that drove my analysis of the individual right
of voluntary association."
These arguments bear some affinity with Ed Baker's broader
thesis that commercial speech may be handled differently and
regulated more hardily than non-commercial speech because market
activity and market agents do not support and engage in the sort of
autonomous activity that is at the core of the free speech protection. 6
A caricatured way of putting the point is that the market's structure
already compels or at least very strongly determines speech content.
So, in upholding regulations of commercial speech, one is not
choosing between compelled and free speech, but between two forms
of regulation: private, self-interested, but uncoordinated regulation
by the market's incentive structure versus public, coordinated, and
(possibly) accountable speech regulation within the context of the
distribution of public goods.
To be sure, these are over-generalizations. There are degrees of
market imperfection that create room for motives, action and
expression that are not fully dictated by rational strategies of profit
maximization. Sometimes these opportunities are taken up.
Nonetheless, there is enough truth to the claims to render me
sympathetic to them as justifications for anti-discrimination laws in
the employment and consumer context. The relative impingement on
individuals' free association interests seems minimal, especially
given the distribution of access to significant basic resources.
Moreover, the associational claim of having social space to interact
with others of one's choosing can be met elsewhere in the context of
voluntary associations.
However, the compelled commercial speech and association
cases give me pause about how far these arguments extend and
whether they lend support the sorts of schemes addressed in the
following cases. Let me start with some specific concerns about
these cases. Then I will circle back to some of the larger theoretical
problems from which they emanate.
15. Id.
16. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989); C.
Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in
Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004).
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United States v. United Foods, Inc.17 held that the First
Amendment invalidated a scheme of the Department of Agriculture
that required mushroom producers to join a commercial association
and to contribute funds to be used toward compelled generic
advertising promoting mushrooms. 8 It came just five years after
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 9 which upheld a
similar scheme involving stone fruit growers from constitutional
challenge." The Court distinguished the two by reasoning that
where the government regulates associational membership and
compels speech as part of a comprehensive economic system of
industry regulation, it more easily passes constitutional muster than
when the regulation is more sporadic, discrete, and speech-focused.
2'
The stone fruit program involved a more comprehensive system of
economic organization, whereas the mushroom regulations seemed
primarily organized around the production of advertisements.
I am sympathetic to a differently reasoned version of the
outcome in United Foods and unlike many commentators, amenable
to the Court's own account of the distinction between United Foods23
and Glickman24 (though not necessarily to its application of that
distinction). I want here to sketch the basis for these stances. I will
put aside the government speech angle alighted upon in the third case
of the series, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n.25 Like other
critics,26 I find it an unsatisfying solution because the government's
identity as speaker is kept subterranean and the publicly presented
speaker is an association of farmers.
17. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
18. Id. at415.
19. 521 U.S. 457 (1996).
20. Id. 476-77.
21. United Foods, 533 U.S. at415.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469-70 (noting that the generic advertising campaign was part of
a broader regulatory scheme).
25. 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (discussing whether the compelled funding of government speech
in the form of generic beef advertisements raises First, Amendment concerns).
26. Id. at 570-80 (Souter, J., dissenting); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and
Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 989 (2005) (noting that Johanns failed to account for
the "private nature of the speech at issue"); Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech:
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 197, 208-09 (arguing that
compelled speech funded by taxation should come under constitutional scrutiny).
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Glickman and United Foods did not feature especially
sympathetic facts. In both cases, large growers objected to joint
advertising schemes because they thought they could do better on
their own by differentiating their products from the crowd and
thereby avoiding subsidizing their smaller competitors. Their other
complaints about the content of the advertising unfortunately looked
like an afterthought. It is hard to detect much of a free speech pull
here when it seems as though the objectors are merely attempting
either to free-ride or to retain their competitive advantage. To find a
real freedom of speech issue here, on these facts, as Robert Post
points out,27 one must emphasize the idea that compelled money
contributions to any speech to which one does not prefer to support
raises substantial free speech concerns.
But these are not the most interesting versions of these cases we
can imagine. Suppose the moral and political objections to the
advertising were more developed and sincere. Some examples have
appeared in the lower courts. 8 Suppose we did not have economic
self-interest dressed up as constitutional principle, but solid moral
and political speech appearing in market garb. Suppose these
objectors were small organic farmers objecting to the
undifferentiated product descriptions, not because they wanted to
differentiate their product as such for self-interested purposes.
Rather, they objected to state efforts to regulate the market for other
economic ends. Consider those who farm organically for moral and
political reasons, from concern for the environment, the health of
consumers, or the humane treatment of animals. 9 Their market
27. See Post, supra note 26, at 218-26; see also Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient
Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods,
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 578 (2006) (noting that one potential reading of
United Foods suggests that the First Amendment prohibits compelled subsidies unless "the state
is justified in forcing them to affiliate with an expressive association"); Robert Post, Viewpoint
Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 169 (2007).
28. See, e.g., Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S.
1058 (2005) (involving dairy farmers who used traditional family farming techniques because
they believed those methods led to "healthier cows, a cleaner environment and superior milk,"
and who challenged a generic milk advertising campaign); Charter v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 230 F.
Supp. 2d 1121, 1122 (D. Mont. 2002), vacated, 412 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving cattle
growers who did not use growth hormones challenged generic beef promotion advertising);
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772, 775 (W.D. Mich.
2002) (involving pork farmers who implemented traditional farming techniques challenged
generic advertising campaign as antithetical to their beliefs).
29. See, e.g., PHILIP CONFORD, THE ORIGINS OF THE ORGANIC MOVEMENT 98-114 (2001);
JULIE GUTHMAN, AGRARIAN DREAMS, THE PARADOX OF ORGANIC FARMING IN CALIFORNIA 23
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activities are concrete expressions of these political, non-self-
regarding (and need I mention dissenting?") stances. Subsidizing
advertising efforts and forced membership in a professional
association that elides the distinction between organic and non-
organic produce has a rather different feel at that level of description.
It may seem more like being forced to refute oneself rather than
simply having to contribute to a beneficial organization whose
methods are not one's style or that diminish an aspect of one's
competitive advantage.
These cases are not best described in the general terms of having
taxes spent on causes and speech with which one disagrees. I do not
aim here to give a full account of the difference or how exactly I
would analyze these cases. Briefly, though, it strikes me as
important that the compulsion is directed at univocal speech as
opposed to a diverse forum as in Board of Regents of University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth;3 1 that the compulsion is not directed
toward flushing out direct and specific factual information (as do
some forms of compelled testimony); that the compulsion is not
directed at articulating information about the product to educate or to
prevent consumer misapprehension otherwise to enable basic
individual safety and functioning; and that it is not one aspect of a
more comprehensive regulatory scheme of economic cooperation.
Finally, it strikes me as relevant that the compelled speech is
presented as the expression of a particularized compelled association
that observers might also reasonably think represents the compelled
party. That is, this association presents itself as speaking on behalf
(2004) (noting that a "generation of growers entered into organic production because of deeply
held political, environmental, philosophical, and/or spiritual values"); Molly O'Neill, Organic
Industry Faces an Ethics Question, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1995, at CI (reporting that a surge in
interest in organic farming has highlighted various motives for becoming organic farmers, from
environmental to capitalist, and has questioned authenticity of organic products).
30. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 1-34
(1999); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 86-109
(1990). The dissenting posture of organic farmers has in recent years, however, been partly
supplanted by the entry of large agribusiness into the market for organic goods. See, e.g.,
Carolyn Dimitri & Catherine Greene, Organic Food Industry Taps Growing American Market,
AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Oct. 2002, at 4; Jake Whitney, Organic Erosion: Will the Term Organic Still
Mean Anything when It's Adopted Whole Hog by Behemoths Such as Wal-Mart?, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 28, 2007, at CM-13.
31. 529 U.S. 217, 229-33 (2000) ("When a university requires its students to pay fees to
support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may
not prefer some viewpoints to others.").
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of the very party who disclaims this relation of representation, who
disclaims that affiliation with the others so represented, and objects
because of moral and political grounds that cannot be reduced to
assertions of economic self-interest.
Rather than trying to develop a full account of these distinctions,
I want to return to the more theoretical argument with which I began,
to draw some loose connections between my allegiance to the
organic farmer and discomfort I have with these arguments and their
general extension, despite my simultaneous attraction to them.
In brief, I will suggest the power of the argument for regulating
commercial speech depends on other economic and political
decisions. Within our own current economic and political scheme,
the argument may underestimate the dynamic structure of the market,
its interplay with morally motivated citizen consumers, and the
importance of using those degrees of freedom available to pursue
moral and political causes.
Recall that I am concerned with the particular argument that the
market is already an amoral space of amoral actors acting and
speaking for financial gain, with relatively few degrees of freedom of
the prized sort. If its structure already determines content-either in
a quite scripted way or in a way that at least undermines or distorts
sincerity sufficiently-then it is tempting to think that governmental
regulation, even compelled speech, does not restrict or displace
prized freedom but rather substitutes one form of (potentially
superior) regulation for another. A fairly well-functioning market
directed at maximizing production and profit is then well-suited to
comprehensive regulation, including regulation of speech, by an
(potentially) accountable public democratic authority so as to direct
its efforts toward superior distributive outcomes and other public
purposes.
This argument imagines, at its ideal, that there is or will be a fair
amount of comprehensive benign government regulation of
economic markets. However, where we forgo that opportunity-
whether for good reasons or because the government's democratic
aspects do not function as they should and markets are spottily
regulated-it is less clear that the amoral model of the market is one
we should endorse solely within the speech context.
That is, conceiving of commercial speech as devoid of
significant expressive content works best when we have or are
COMPELLED ASSOCIATION
priming to organize market interactions well in a morally sensitive
but more comprehensive way. When we elect not to do that and
instead treat participants as independent agents, there are detractions
to this view, at least if it is a view that we put to the test of asking
whether we would wish it to be publicly known and accepted. I'm
not sure it is wise or desirable to adopt a theory that if publicly
known, accepted, and implemented would not only treat market
actors as amoral, but would encourage market actors-whether
producers, advertisers, or consumers-to adopt this as a self-
conception (that is, to think of themselves as amoral, apolitical
agents).
If our lives are going to be dominated by a more decentralized
market, then we should encourage morally motivated market activity
and recognize forms of market activity that attempt to moralize the
market from within, given the absence of a well-organized, coherent,
comprehensive form of external morally motivated regulation. This
is, in part, the turn taken by some parts of the Left (as well as some
parts of the Right, and religious groups of varying political
orientations) to develop forms of concrete political activity pursued
through market activity to provide viable options for consumers who
are also politically motivated but lack options because of regulatory
failures, deliberate omissions, or lapses. 2 These are political stances
that cannot be fully realized by individuals alone, but require
collective action. I take it this is the point, or at least the original
ambition, of the organic farming movement, the locally produced
movement, and a variety of emerging businesses, such as
TerraPass,33 that attempt to provide products and services to enable
environmentally sound forms of living. These enterprises are not
best understood as amoral businesses aiming to maximize profit.
They are attempting to integrate, express, and infuse moral and
32. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Gould, Fair Trade and the Consumer Interest: A Personal Account,
27 INT'L J. CONSUMER STUD. 341, 343 (2003) (arguing that Fair Trade has been successful by
sparking consumer interest via an emphasis on psychic benefit); Anil Hira & Jared Ferrie, Fair
Trade: Three Key Challenges for Reaching the Mainstream, 63 J. Bus. ETHICS 107, 107 (2006)
(defining fair trade as a movement to insert ethical decision making into consumerism and
focusing on the challenges to expanded growth of fair trade markets); Robert J.S. Ross, No
Sweat: Hard Lessons from Garment Industry History, 53 DISSENT 50 (2006) (chronicling efforts
to promote fair labor practices through garment labels like "No Sweat").
33. TerraPass is a for-profit organization that sells "passes" to fund renewable energy
programs which reduce greenhouse gasses. See TerraPass, http://www.terrapass.com (last visited
Oct. 6, 2007).
Fall 2007]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol.41:317
political concerns into commercial interactions: by transforming the
market from within through political activism achieved in part
through commerce. To be clear, I do not claim that such private
efforts are purely altruistic, that they will be successful, or that they
will approach the success that governmental regulation could
produce. I do mean to claim, however, that the law should make
space for and accommodate moral agents and moral activity, where
possible. 4 Such activities have a place even in (especially in?)
market domains and are connected to core First Amendment interests
of moral and political expression.
The interest in creating space for morally motivated market
activity suggests a more accommodationist approach to commercial
speech in cases of compelled association with other commercial
agents. On such an approach, we should, in First Amendment
analysis, be sensitive to the degree to which the objection to
compelled association for the purposes of compelled speech stems
from a core aspect of a commercial entity's substantive, non-self-
interested mission or message, as defined and evident in contexts
other than the occasion of objection.
To be sure, in the voluntary association context, I have been
critical of the requirement that compelled association must disrupt a
particular message for it to be objectionable from a First Amendment
perspective because of concerns about individuals' general interest in
comfortable social havens for the development as well as the
expression of thoughts.35 In the commercial context, those concerns
are not at the forefront. Here, there is reason to return to and place
emphasis on a more message-oriented approach, but one that
differentiates between purely self-interested messages and messages
with broader moral and political content. Such a distinction would
be unthinkable in the individual context, but may have a home in
some comers of the commercial context because individual speech
interests are not at stake and our joint social product is being created,
albeit in a decentralized way. Creating more breathing space for the
34. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REv. 708, 711-13 (2007); see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Egalitarianism, Choice-Sensitivity,
and Accommodation, in REASON AND VALUE: THEMES FROM THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF
JOSEPH RAz, 270, 288-95 (R. Jay Wallace & Samuel Scheffler eds., 2004); Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
205, 208 (2000).
35. See Shiffrin, supra note 8.
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development and expression of conscience within the market domain
may be a form of content non-neutrality worth fighting for.
To return to my opening concession to Steve's eclecticism, the
approach I have been sketching is one in which the approach we
should take to compelled commercial speech and compelled
commercial association may depend upon other, contingent decisions
we have made about economic and political structure. Hence, it
seems as though the correct First Amendment analysis is not dictated
purely by the sort of speech at hand, but on a variety of non-speech-
related factors. In this domain at least, our First Amendment
jurisprudence should be sensitive to and perhaps vary with the facts
and other decisions we make about economic context and climate.
Our approach should be sensitive to the degree and level of
enterprise regulation more generally.
This explains my sympathy toward the distinction articulated to
defend the pair of results in Glickman and United Foods. Where we
otherwise, in other aspects of our economic policy, incline toward
treating the relevant agents as relatively free and unconnected agents
who happen to share an industry rather than as parts of a well-
regulated and coordinated industry, then we should be more open to
treating them as free agents in the speech context. We should
recognize and protect the degree to which they aim to introduce
economic considerations that are not purely self-interested into our
public discourse and into our market interactions as well as the
degree to which they aim to respond to these same impulses in
consumers.
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